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LEGISLATING OUR REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS: MAKING
THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT
WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
DAVID MILLER
INTRODUCTION: Tm MILLENNIAL GENERATION
HAS A PROBLEM
"We lived on farms, then we lived in cities, and now we're gonna live
on the internet!"'
Perhaps no other area of the law has struggled to adapt to the
internet's exponentially increasing ubiquity and penneation into citizens'
everyday lives than fundamental privacy protection. It is not news that the
internet has become the definitive first stop in the quest to read the latest
news, check the most recent sports scores, and research any topic.
Critically, however, with the exponential rise of online social networks
(OSNs), the internet is also where people share the most personal,
intimate details of their lives. Extremely popular services such as
Facebook 2 provide forums to post pictures, message friends, and engage in
social comnientary in ways that are as novel as they are easy to use. Never
before have the vast majority of citizens possessed such a public
mouthpiece to broadcast such seemingly private details, and never before
has such a mode of personal expression become a social necessity for so
many so quickly.
However, accompanying this dramatic increase in the dissemination of
personal information are profound difficulties in applying current
workplace privacy protections to OSN use. In fact, the Supreme Court
recently opined that these "[r]apid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the
technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior" and
thereby make it so "the Court would have difficulty predicting how
employees' privacy expectations will be shaped by those changes or the
degree to which society will be prepared to recognize them as
reasonable."' Noting these tough questions, the Court did what has all-
too-often been the norm for privacy cases and held "[t]hough the case
touches issues of farreaching significance . . . it can be resolved by settled
I The Social Network (Columbia Pictures 2010)(quoting Sean Parker as played by Justin Timberlake).
2 See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook: One Billion and Counting, WALL SIREET JOURNAl, Oct. 5, 2012, at
BI. (Reporting that Facebook officially surpassed one billion monthly active members on September 14, 2012).
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (20 10).
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principles." 4 These "settled principles," of course, remain amorphous-
predicated on malleable, abstract conceptions that are fundamentally
unsettled in their application to the millennial generation and OSNs.
The unfortunate reality is that OSN use is setting social norms,
including those regarding workplace privacy expectations, at far too fast a
pace for the existing legal protections.5 In the private employer context,
devoid of the baseline protection of the Fourth Amendment (and to a
lesser degree certain First Amendment protections), the legal enforcement
of privacy protections regarding OSNs takes on even further complexity.
Court precedent and current statutory protections are altogether outdated,
inadequate, and unprepared to recognize the seismic societal shifts
consequence to OSNs.
Concurrent with this murky protection, private employer use of OSN
information in the hiring process, monitoring current employees, and
making disciplinary decisions are all on the rise.6 These trends are
mirrored in education, especially at the high school and college levels.'
Indeed, survey data from the Society for Human Resource Management
reported that in 2011 56% of employers reported use of social media in
the hiring process, an increase from 34% in 2008.8 Employers
undoubtedly have legitimate interests in learning about prospective
candidates they wish to hire and shielding themselves from liability against
negligent hiring down the line amongst other concerns. Furthermore,
employers also possess a tremendous need to ensure their current
employees do not damage the reputation of the company, gain access to
or publicize critical financial information or trade secrets, use employer
provided resources for personal purposes, and ensure workplace morale by
preventing overt criticism of the business. The legal question concerns the
point at which the methods of OSN information acquisition and
surveillance employers engage to effectuate these goals intrude upon the
privacy rights of employees and applicants. There is an inevitable tension,
and thus far the scales tip grossly towards the employers.
4 Id. at 2624.
5 Seegenerally Patricia Sanchez Abril, Avner Levin, & Alyssa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media
and the Twenty-First Century Employee, 49 AM. Bus. LJ. 63 (2012) [hereinafter Blurred Boundaries].
6 Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites
to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENr. & TiEci . L. 445, 457 (2008) ("It is clear that employers are increasingly
checking the social networking profiles of their applicants and that those applicants may suffer as a result of the
information they have posted on the Internet.").
7 Id.
8 Scott Brutocao, Issue Spotting: The Multitude of Ways Social Media Impacts Employment Law and
Litigation, 60 Timn- Anvoc. (TEXAS) 8, 9 (2012).
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Due to their unique nature, OSNs represent more than merely the
next technological difficulty in the long chain of difficult privacy law
adaptations'. Rather, because of the interplay between customizable
privacy settings on OSNs themselves, the distribution of content to many
people as opposed to direct one-on-one discussion, and the sheer number
of people in the network itself many of the traditional privacy analysis
factors do not apply'o. OSNs remove physical space and blur the line
between public statements and personal items of self-identification
intended to remain outside the bounds of inquiry".
Recently, academic research has elucidated the notions of privacy
expectations of OSN users' 2 . The apparent discord between the
unwavering desire to post private information on OSNs and the adamant
intrusiveness felt when that information falls into particular hands or is
used for particular purposes is resolved by the theory of network
privacy.' 3  Network privacy posits "information is considered by online
socializers to be private as long as it is not disclosed outside of the network
to which they initially disclosed it, if it originates with them, or as long as
it does not affect their established online personae, if it originates with
others." 4
Put another way, the OSN user notion of privacy is grounded in
access: it is invasive of protected privacy interests when particular
information reaches unintended audiences without permission based on
the contextual appropriateness of that access. OSN users simply desire
what was at the heart of privacy advocacy in Brandeis and Warren's
seminal article originally arguing for its legal basis here in the United
States" - the ability to maintain separate spheres in ones life between what
is public and what is private. This notion of autonomy over the audience
9 See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online Personal Privacy, 45 WAKE
FORESI L. REv, 689, 701 (2010) ("To date, however, the law has suffered from dubious applicability in the online
social world.") [hereinafter Private Ordering].
5o See Patricial Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HAltv. J.L. & Tici-i. 1, 5
(2007) ("New technologies have enabled novel social situations that generate privacy harms and concerns that
were unforeseeable. ) [hereinafter Privacy Torts].
1 Id. at 3.
2 See Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VANo. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 1001 (2009). [hereinafter Two Notions]. The findings and discussions in this article are foundational to the
arguments made in this piece and form the basis for the theoretical underpinnings of why OSN user privacy
expectations are indeed reasonable. This work has been cited thoroughly in the academic literature on OSN
privacy and its valuable contribution to the discourse on this topic cannot be overstated.
13 Id. at 1002.
14 Id.
15 Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAikv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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for which certain expressions are intended was central to their influential
writing: "In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether
that which is his shall be given to the public."'" Thus, while OSNs have
made certain information easier to gather on an applicant or employee,
this should not be taken as an excuse to legitimize the departure from long
established principles of privacy law and policy. Thus, the key to
protecting privacy interests surrounding OSNs in the workplace moving
forward is having a law grounded in clear distinctions regarding employer
and employee access to the wealth of contextual information shared on
OSNs.
Critically, to effectively protect the privacy interests of employees and
the legitimate business interests of employers the enactment of legislation
is required. In the wake of a failed federal effort", a recent trend of states,
beginning with Maryland", passing laws that for the first time explicitly
draw lines for what private employers can and cannot do in the realm of
OSNs in the workplace is underway. This is the greatest evidence so far of
the access theory in action-and the results have been positive. While this
trend is certainly encouraging, much more needs to be done.
This note will make the case that it is only through explicit federal
legislation, and not reliance on the courts, private employers, the states, or
OSN company policies to strike the proper balance between individual
privacy and employer interests. Part I discusses the network privacy
theory, analyzing it as the extension of traditional notions of reasonable
privacy expectations and their Constitutional underpinnings to digital age
OSN use. Next, Part II outlines in detail the current state laws that have
been passed, comparing differences in methodology and the resulting
consequences. These laws reflect for the first time a proactive approach
predicated on the access theory of privacy and the direction the law must
continue on. Part III provides a discussion of the tangential privacy
protections currently in place for private employee OSN use to illustrate
their woeful inadequacy when translated to OSNs while noting there are
encouraging trends in the law. Finally, Part IV concludes that the time is
ripe for Congress to pass uniform, comprehensive legislation in this field
16 Id. at 199.
17 Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 5050, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter "SNOPA"].
The bill failed to pass along party lines due to Republican opposition and never made it out of committee, but has
since been reintroduced in the 113th Congress. Eliot Engel, Jan Schakowsky, & Michael Grimm, SNOPA
addresses online privacy concerns, THm HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG: WHERE LAWMAKERS COME [O BLOC (May 15,
2012, 1:46 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/227509-snopa-addresses-onlne-privacy-
concerns.
i8 Mo. CoDE ANN., Labor and Employment S 3-712 (West 2013).
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to provide a mandatory minimum for workplace OSN privacy. This
approach helps maintain employee privacy while employers shield
themselves from potential discrimination suits under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act" and claims under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)2 0 . Ultimately, this note will offer reasonable uniform legislative
minimum standards to provide the best outcome for all parties involved so
that lines may continue to be drawn and protection of privacy
expectations may flourish in the age of social media.
PART I: NETWORK PRIVACY AND THE ACCESS THEORY OF
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The fact that privacy law in the United States is struggling to adapt to
critical technological changes in society is neither new nor surprising.2'
Since the constitutional recognition of privacy as a fundamental right22 its
doctrinal development often raises more questions than it answers. The
twin pillars of the generally reactionary nature of United States common
law and having grounded privacy protections in societal and individual
"reasonable expectations" created a system wherein the law must
consistently adapt to social norms that technological innovation has
already exerted its considerable influence upon. However, contrary to
what certain academics and industry leaders have posited,2 3 the purported
disconnect between OSN users expectations of privacy online and the
core principles of American privacy law ideals are not so fundamental.
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2 (2012).
20 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5§ 151-169 (2012).
21 Blurred Boundaries, supra note 5, at 698 ("If we cannot always agree on what is properly private
subject matter in the physical world, consensus oiline is surely impossible in a universe devoid of physical
boundaries, traditional culture, and shared understandings among its participants.").
22 ". . . specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The "penumbra" here, the right to marital privacy, was "formed by
emanations" from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Douglas's majority
decision garnered seven votes, but the penumbra rationale merely five as Justices White and Harlan wrote
concurrences grounded in the due process clause, the latter of which would form the doctrinal basis for
recognition of further unenumerated privacy rights. Justice Goldberg wrote a concurrence joined by Justices
Brennan and ChiefJustice Warren relying on the Ninth Amendment as an alternative source of the fundamental
privacy right. Justices Black and Stewart each dissented. Needless to say, the Court did not mark a clear path upon
which constitutional privacy jurisprudence was to develop.
23 Facebook founder, Chairman and CEO Mark Zuckerberg himself has asserted internet privacy is no
longer a social norm. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy no longer a social norm, says Facebook founder, Tiiim GuARDIAN (JAN.
10, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy
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Academics and legal scholars have long debated the definition of
privacy, and as a result the rationales for protection of the right.2 4 Despite
the lack of a unanimous definition, colloquially or legally, as to precisely
what privacy is, the law remains a function of citizen expectations of it and
whether society objectively finds those expectations reasonable.
Without an explicit textual basis in the Constitution the wide breadth
of "reasonable" expands further into private sector norms without the
cognizable limits imposed by other constitutional provisionS25. Because all
of these protections depend in part on an actual expectation of privacy
"that society is prepared to recognized as reasonable," private employers
retain the right to determine what in fact the reasonable expectations of
privacy its employees retain through the issuance of company policies and
rules26 . From its inception, United States constitutional privacy protection
created specific "zones of privacy" stemming from the "penumbras" of
other rights, and "emanations of guarantees" made textually explicit 27 .
Therefore, because privacy is defined solely in terms of individuals right
to privacy in a certain capacity28 all ensuing legislation protects privacy in
narrow circumstances against particularized, and mainly governmental
intrusions. This dichotomy presents the pernianent difficulty of privacy
law in common law tort jurisprudence, legislative proposals and
enactments, and constitutional interpretation: what is the foundational
premise behind what "reasonable expectations of privacy" the
government, the Constitution, and courts aim to protect? In other words,
what is the underlying link between these "zones" of privacy and how do
citizens, society, and the courts inform their "reasonable expectations"
before they gain legal recognition?
Legal analysis summarizes the approaches taken by modern, Western,
democratic states by generally placing them in two broad categories:
24 See generally Two Notions, supra note 12 at 1006-1017.
25 "Private sector employees do not enjoy any Fourth Amendment rights vis-i-vis searches or
surveillance by their employers under the U.S. Constitution. Any work-related privacy rights that private
employees may have are derived from a common law right to privacy developed among the states during the
twentieth century." Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are
Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, Berkeley Tech. L.J. 979, 990 (2011).
26 "Employers can destroy actual expectations through the use of notices and consent forms." Id. at 991.
27 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
28 "The United States has taken a sectoral approach to privacy, enacting laws that apply to specific
industries and practices. . This patchwork approach is im contrast to the European nations, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and Hong Kong." Beth Givens, Open Presentation at Santa Clara University Symposium on
Internet Privacy (Feb. 11-12, 2000)(transcript available at https://www.privacyrights.org/ar/xpect.htm). Both
the "penumbras" and due process rationales of Griswold adhere to this sectoral approach.
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privacy as a protection of control and privacy as a protection of dignity.
29
The control, or autonomy approach, theorizes that "When individuals are
allowed to act with autonomy and are treated as ends in and of themselves,
their human rights, dignity, and liberty are assured."o3 The autonomy
theory revolves around the value people place on the protected choice for
people to "barter away their privacy" in specific circumstances."' In a
similar, but functionally distinguishable manner, the privacy as a
protection of individual dignity approach emphasizes the personal
development of the inner self and personality.32 Thus, an individual
maintains several "public personas": each are accessible only by specific
constituencies in specific contexts and it is the protection of the
individual's inability to freely manage disclosure of these "personas" that
forms the impetus for privacy protection. 3
United States privacy law is often said to fit within the autonomy
theory. The emphasis placed on the protection of free speech and the
difficulty in judicially assessing the merits of someone claiming to have
been "shamed" or "disrespected" by a privacy violation arguably make
control-based protections of privacy more practical". For example, in tort
law to win a claim of public disclosure of private facts the plaintiff
generally must show the defendant publicized a private fact that was not of
legitimate public concern, where such disclosure was highly offensive to a
reasonable person." Thus, the inquiry turns on the "reasonable
expectations" of the victims in guarding that particular private fact
(provided it is not of legitimate public concern), inherently giving much
weight to whether or not the plaintiff relinquished control to therefore
impact how reasonable the expectation of it remaining private remained
over that fact3 6 .
On the other hand, the European Union (EU) provides an excellent
illustration of the privacy as dignity theory promoting particular policy 3 7 .
Under Article 8 of the European Union Convention on Human Rights
citizens are protected from state interference with "his private life and
29 Two Notions, supra note 12 at 1008.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1013.
3 Id.
3 Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 Miss. C. L. Rov. 227, 231 (2012)
thereinafter Henderson].
35 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
36 See Two Notions, supra, note 12 at 1010-1011.
3 Id. at 1014.
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family life, his home and his correspondence."" Moreover, "There shall
be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of his right [to
private life] except such as is in accordance with the law." 9 Thus, the law
takes a hardline approach to individual dignity interests as opposed to the
choice of disclosure, setting up privacy protection as the default rule. It is
the concern with casting the private lives of citizens as "off limits" from
government scrutiny that is reflected by the privacy legislation. This
disconnect between the approaches can be seen in Europe's reluctance to
provide lessened privacy protection for celebrities and public figures,
while the US makes this an explicit part of its libel and slander laws4 0:
what expectations are "reasonable" are again a product of the disclosure
choice and public figures in a sense have forfeited a great deal of this
choice41
However, it is disingenuous to pigeonhole the US patchwork
approach to privacy protection as neatly fitting in the autonomy sphere
entirely at the expense of the dignity sphere. Not only are the concepts so
intertwined to make this distinction often superfluous in practice, but US
privacy law also has roots in aspects of the dignity theory. Warren and
Brandeis' aforementioned landmark article famously discussed privacy as
simply "the right to be let alone." 42 The authors noted that "solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual" and therefore the
law must protect the privacy interests of individuals' "inviolate
personality" in a clear formulation of what is now referred to as the
dignity approach.4 3 But the initial proponents of privacy protection went
on to assert that the law "secures to each individual the riht of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others."4 4 This right to determine the "extent" of
communication adheres precisely to network privacy and the particular
difficulties of OSNs, notably the practical inapplicability of the wholly
binary distinction between "private" and "public" to determine
reasonable expectations of privacy.
Federal law has generally addressed privacy concerns only tangentially
38 European Convention on Human Rights. art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
39 Id.
40 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (Establishing "actual malice" standard for public
officials to recover in libel actions without contravening First Amendment protections).
41 Two Notions, supra, note 12 at 1015-16.
42 Warren and Brandeis, The R(ght to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 193 (1890).
3 Id. at 201.
44 Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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as they relate to other harms", and the inevitable inconsistencies render it
impossible for one theory to dominate the other. Inevitably, the
protection of individual autonomy of what information is disclosed
remains a function of dignity for if the exposure of that information did
not negatively affect the individual than no protection would be sought.
In the tort of private disclosure example, supra, the determination of
reasonability in the privacy expectation is "highly dependent on the
nature of the space or inforiation invaded, the circumstances surrounding
the breach, and the prevailing social norms.""6 Thus, while surely not an
all-encompassing rght to dignity as enacted in the EU, the privacy
infringement is predicated on both protecting autonomy of choice in
disclosure and on that choice itself as the ultimate protection for dignity
based on prevailing social norms and individual circumstances. In other
words, when the choice has been breached by an unwanted disclosure, the
privacy violation results in dignitary harm to the individual by stripping
them of this choice.
Therefore, in essence, US privacy regulation is grounded in concepts
of both autonomy and dignity. The "right to privacy" that Warren and
Brandeis sought in 1890 has never materialized in the form of an explicit,
all-encompassing piece of legislation or even a determination that it is
constitutionally provided in the form they sought47 . Rather, the
subsequent "zones of privacy" show the accurate paradigm through which
to view the foundation of privacy expectations in the US is that of access.
The protection of individual privacy is a function of protecting dignity
through the maintenance of autonomy: in other words, privacy protection
aims to prevent access to certain items by certain people in certain
contexts by placing the onus on the individual to reasonably control the
perceived potential dignitary harms based on reasonable expectations of
45 Federal statutory examples include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (regulating consumer
financial information), the Privacy Act of 1974 (regulating use of personal identifying information in federal
records), the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (prohibiting cable television providers from disclosing
personally identifiable information and allowing customers to view and verify this information), the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (extending government wiretap restrictions to electronic computer
transmissions), the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (preventing wrongful disclosure of video tape rental and
sale records), the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (restricting telephone solicitation and the use of
automatic dialing systems), the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (governing privacy and disclosure of
personal information possessed by state motor vehicle administrations), and the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998 (setting privacy guidelines for personal information collection concerning children).
46 Two Notions, supra, note 12 at 1010-11.
7 "We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact nature are not rights
arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as against the world." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Pvracy, at 213.
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privacy. In other words, network privacy. Once one accepts that access,
autonomy, and dignity are inevitably intertwined in the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis under the US system, the theory of
network privacy becomes the logical extension of this notion to the most
difficult technological challenge to individual privacy yet-the internet and
OSNs.
OSN user behavior and research affirm access as the foundation for
reasonable expectations of privacy48 . Studies indicate that overwhelming
majorities of OSN users are well aware of the ease in which unintended
audiences may see posted content,49 consistently use privacy settings
availableso, and yet will not consider eliminating OSN use for the sake of
increased privacy5 1 . In fact, a majority of OSN users in a recent survey
agreed with the statement, "It is not right when people can have access to
information not intended for them."5 2 The problem lies in the inherent
legal assumption that voluntary disclosure extinguishes reasonable
expectations to the world-an assumption entirely foreign to millennial
OSN users. Likewise, these notions are not contradictory, but rather
reflect first and foremost the social necessity that OSNs have attained in
that their continued use is functionally equivalent to attaining
employment. Furthermore, user behavior illustrates that although users
acknowledge breaches of their privacy they do not find them acceptable.
Seventy-five percent of survey respondents indicated that "employer
monitoring or accessing of employees' OSN profiles" is inappropriate
while a similar majority said they would be "willing to share certain private
information openly with employers.""
The distillation of OSN user behavior and academic survey data shows
a desire, and arguably a perceived necessity to enjoy the social utility of
OSNs with clearly defined boundaries as to who may view particular
content. In essence, just as ones in-person identity means something
different to one network as it does to another, individuals view their OSN
personae with the same ability to segregate for various audiences-even
when those groups are large in number.54 However, users are not willing
48 See generally, Two Notions, supra note 12. See also Bryce Clayton Newell, Rethinking Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 17 Ricii. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2011) [hereinafter Newell].
49 Two Notions, supra, note 12 at 1036.
s 72% of users surveyed restricted their privacy settings and 54% blocked specific people from accessing
their profile. Id. at 1033.
st Id. at 1045.
52 Blurred Boundaries, supra, note 5 at 100.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
5 Newell, supra, note 48 at 18.
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to sacrifice OSN participation to achieve this because they generally do
indeed expect the information posted on OSNs to remain private from
unauthorized parties-". It is this expectation, that certain content is "off
limits" from employers and prospective employers because of the decision
made by the user that the law must recognize as reasonable. It is time for
this "zone of privacy" to gain legal recognition as something society is
willing to accept as reasonable.
PART II: LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION, ACCESS, AND MOVING IN
THE RIGHT DIRECTION
"[I]nternet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
social networking site conmunications and affairs."" No longer merely
the battle cry of internet privacy proponents or advocacy groups, the
Delaware General Assembly recognized explicitly, along with five other
states, that OSN privacy expectations are reasonable, subject to harmful
violation, and are in need of legislative protection. As of March 2013
Maryland", California", Illinois", New Jersey 1 , Delaware61 , and
Michigan 62 have each passed legislation that for the first time specifically
targets OSN privacy and places legal restrictions on private institutions as
to what they can and cannot do regarding prospective and current
members OSN information. Maryland began the charge, and along with
Illinois its law regulates private employer conduct. New Jersey and
Delaware passed laws concerning higher education institutions, while
California and Michigan 3 took the most comprehensive approach to
regulate both employers and educational institutions. In addition,
legislation to similar effect has been introduced and is pending at some
ss Blurred Boundaries, supra, note 5 at 109.
56 H.R. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (De. 2012).
s7 Mo. CODE ANN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2013).
58 CAL. LAB. Coi)E 980 (West 2013); CAL. Enuc. CoDE: § 99120-99122 (West 2013).
59 820 ILL. COMP. Si Ar. 55 / 10 (2013).
60 N.J. S iAr. ANN. § 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013).
si DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101-8105 (West 2013).
62 MIH. COMP. LAws S 37.271 to S 37.278 (2012).
63 Michigan's legislation is arguably the most comprehensive in terms of its coverage breadth of
applicable entities. It reaches all employers, public and private, as well as any "educational institution." The law
states, "Educational institution ... includes an academy; elementary or secondary school; extension course;
kindergarten; nursery school; school system; school district; intermediate school district; business, nursing,
professional, secretarial, technical, or vocational school; public or private educational testing service or
administrator; and an agent of an educational institution." Id.
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phase of the law-making process in a total of 31 states64 .
While the laws possess significant variability in many important
aspects, their common thread is to effectuate the setting of reasonable
privacy expectations and norms in the OSN context. Critically, the laws
adhere to the access theory of network privacy in their intent and
functionality through formal definitions and the creation of specific zones
of privacy. The laws remove the onus from the courts to determine
reasonability of certain specific behaviors in the OSN arena, and this
approach represents evidence of the access theory in action. The speed
and proliferation of these laws provides optimism, and is not only a
massive first step towards OSN privacy protection in the workplace, but
also a signal that the proper legislative course has been chartered.
A. State Legislation Predicated on Access to Protect Reasonable
Expectations of Network Privacy
"Members of the workforce should not be punished for information
their employers don't legally have the right to have. . .As use of social
media continues to expand, this new law will protect workers and their
right to personal privacy."6 ' Echoing the sentiment of the Delaware
General Assembly, supra, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn spoke those words
upon signing the Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act. However, the
potential legal significance of the particular legislative method of attack
goes far beyond pleasant-sounding political rhetoric.
First, the proposed and enacted laws at the state level are unanimously
aimed at precluding employer (or educational institution) access to
6 As of March 2013 these states are: Maryland, Illinois, Delaware, California, New Jersey, Michigan,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See NATIONAL
CONFEIiRNCE OF STATE LE.GISLATURES, EMPLOYER ACCESS TO SOCIAL MEDIA USERNAMES AND PAsswoRos
2013 (MAR. 6, 2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-
niedia-passwords-2013.aspx and NATIONAL CONFERE.NCEc oi STATE LEGISLATUis, EMPLOYER ACCESS To
SOCIAL MEDIA USERNAMES AND PASSWORDs 2012 (JAN. 17, 2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/telecon/enmployer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx [together hereinafter NCSL OSN Summary].
While there are significant aspects of the proposed laws yet to be enacted, the focus here is on the six states whose
legislation has become law not only because it is merely speculative to analyze the proposed legislation before it is
amended, let alone passed, but also because the six states form a representative sample for all of the proposals.
65 Press Release, Illinois Government News Network, Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Protect
Workers' Right to Privacy (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www3.ilinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.
cfn?SubjectlD=2&RecNum=l0442 [hereinafter IL Press Release]
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particular OSN information on employees and applicants6 6 . After a series
of news reports spearheaded by an Associated Press story6 7  stirred
tremendous controversy over employers asking for Facebook passwords as
a precondition to employment in the hiring process, states responded
swiftly with legislation. Thus, the press has characterized these laws as
"password protection" or "Facebook password" bills6 8 , but this
oversimplification clouds the fundamental impact this particular legal
approach and the interests sought to protect carries with it.
States did not choose merely to prohibit employers from using OSN
information for specific purposes or preclude what they find through
snooping, coercion, or company policies concerning OSNs from affecting
hiring or promotion decisions. The laws also do not simply say that
employees reserve the right not to provide their password information if
they so chose. Rather, the laws literally place certain employer access out
of bounds in a legal sense. Thus, the laws provide a direct impediment on
private employer conduct in an area where legitimate reasons for the
conduct is at least arguable6 1. This alone is a monumental step forward to
protect individual OSN privacy rights.
For example, the Maryland law provides, "An employer may not
request or require that an employee or applicant disclose any user name,
password, or other means for accessing a personal account or service through
an electronic communications device."o7 1 In Illinois employers may not
"demand access in any manner to an employee's or prospective employee's
account or profile on a social networking website." 7 Michigan employers
cannot "Request an employee or an applicant for employment to grant
access to, allow observation of, or disclose information that allows access to or
observation of the employee's or applicant's personal internet account. "72
66 NCSL OSN Summary, supra, note 64.
67 Manuel ValdesJob Seekers getting asked fir Facebook passwords, YAM-oo! FINANCE (Mar. 20, 2012, 7:55
AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/job-seekers-getting-asked-facebook-080920368.html
6 See David Kravets, 6 States Bar Employers From Demanding Farebook Passwords, WoutEi (an. 2, 2013,
2:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/password-protected-states/; see also Maryland Becomes
First State to OK Facebook Password Protection Bill, HUFFINGTON PoS'r (Apr. 22, 2012, 12:06 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/20/nmaryland-becomes-first-st n 1439866.htmi
69 "While an appplicant's interest in keeping an OSN profile private is understandable, employers also
have compelling and legitimate business interests in obtaining as much information about job applicants as
possible." Alissa Del Riego, Patricia Sanchez Abril, Avner Levin, Your Password or Your Paycheck?: Ajob Applicant's
Murky Right to Social Media Privacy, 16 No. 3 J. INTERNEr L. 1, 18 (2012) [hereinafter Password or Paycheck].
70 MD. Coi ANN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
7i 820 lu. Comp. STAi. 55 / 10 (2013) (emphasis added).
72 MicH. CoMP. LAWS S 37.271 to § 37.278. (2012) (emphasis added).
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Of the enacted legislation, California pushes the farthest, prohibiting
employers and schools from "requiring or requesting. . .to disclose a
username or passwordfor the purpose of accessing personal social media, to access
personal social media in the presence of the employer, or to divulge any
personal social media."" The enacted and proposed legislation uniformly
contain the word "access" and use employer access as the starting point for
protection".
This approach has major consequences. First, it makes explicit that the
OSN content, and not solely the password or user information, is itself
protected. It successfully shifts control to the individual OSN user, by
requiring the need for a password or other means, as to what employers
can and cannot see regarding their personal OSN content. Thus, through
legal requirement users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
personal OSN use that, at a nuinimum, requires user-created access
controls to view. This differs extraordinarily from legal restrictions on
what employers may do with specific OSN-related information after
acquisition. That would not codify any newfound privacy expectations or
truly disrupt workplace norms and would provide employers considerable
leeway in creating ad hoc justifications for decisions influenced by OSN
content.
Moreover, "the current trend for young Americans toward using
social networks as a primary vehicle for effecting positive social and
political change establishes social networks as the new digital age 'public
square' for important discourse."" By conforming the laws to the
network privacy theory of access-based expectations of privacy, these
OSN laws acknowledge and effectively promote the benefits of OSN use
in society. Research indicates that OSN users are "willing to take on
acknowledged privacy risks" despite being "highly cognizant that they are
relinquishing control over their information and its destination."76 This
truth, combined with the overwhelming popularity of OSNs means that
this is not a short-term phenomenon, but rather, the future course of
critical societal discourse. The role that OSNs play in society is no longer
in dispute, and by centering legislation on employer access this effectuates
7 CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
74 NCSL OSN Summary, supra, note 64.
S H.R. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (De. 2012).
76 Two Notions, supra, note 12 at 1045.
n The Delaware General Assembly estimated in May 2012 that "75% of American online adults ages 18
to 24 and 56% of American online adults ages 25 to 34 have a profile on a social network site." H.R. 309, 146th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (De. 2012).
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a formal recognition of activity states wish to promote".
The protection of OSNs from this perspective can only be achieved
with the network privacy approach. Only if the valuable uses are
promoted while the potential harms, including workplace and educational
privacy, are simultaneously defended may OSNs prosper at the level they
need to. California emphasized this in Section 1 of its social media
legislation: "The legislature finds and declares that quickly evolving
technologies and social media services and Internet Web sites create new
challenges when seeking to protect. . .privacy rights. . .It is the intent of
the legislature to protect those rights."" States have adroitly refused to
cabin their legislation purely to password protection, and have instead
taken a firm, network-privacy based view wherein seeking access to
specific user-protected content is flat-out off limits from private employers
or institutions of higher learning. With this foundation, the legislation
protects privacy interests and allows OSNs to proliferate in their critical
role to facilitate discourse.
B. The Use of Formal Definitions
The first step any access-based approach to privacy regulation must
take is to formally define specific terms and elements. This task is as
essential as it is difficult. In the six states with OSN laws on the books
there is substantial variance in terminology, and consequently in the
implementation of the scheme of regulation."o Furthermore, the states
take different paths to reconcile the inherent difficulty in placing legal
parameters around colloquial and technological terms that are subject to
change at a rapid pace. The precise definitions of terminology are
significant also because it is the primary vehicle through which the scope
of protection and rights are defined. A state cannot purport to regulate
OSN use without first defining what OSNs are in the context of social
media and the technological landscape. Again, the use of formal
definitions helps inform individuals as to what privacy expectations are
reasonable in the OSN context by placing boundaries around particular
networks.
Maryland was the first state to pass OSN-related legislation, and
78 "Permitting public and nonpublic institutions of higher learning to demand that students and
applicants provide access to their social networking site profiles and accounts could substantially chill the
importan discourse occurring on social networking sites" Id.
79 CAL. EDUC. CODE S 99120-99122 (West 2013).
8o NCSL OSN Summary, supra, note 64.
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interestingly the only state not to attempt to define in any way the types of
OSNs, services, or technology that falls under its purview."' In this sense,
Maryland came closest to truly passing a "password protection" bill: "an
employer may not request or require that an employee or applicant
disclose any user name, password, or other means for accessing a personal
account or service through an electronic communications device."82 The
terms "personal account" or "service" are not defined. Thus, Maryland
potentially provides broad protection through its "other means for
accessing" language, but OSN privacy protection may likewise be
hindered by failing to place qualifying parameters around "personal" and
"nonpersonal" accounts in an age where work life and personal life often
blend together. For example, Maryland courts may eventually wrestle
with the difficult question of whether business accounts unrelated to the
employer's business seeking to access OSN content is truly
"nonpersonal"."
However, Maryland did define "electronic communications device"
as "any device that uses electronic signals to create, transmit, and receive
information. . .includes computers, telephones, personal digital assistants,
and other similar devices."" Delaware and New Jersey also define the
term similarly". All three appear attempts at providing a "catch all" for
any device that may be used to gain access to a personal OSN account,
but New Jersey uses the most inclusive language. 6
Unlike Maryland, the balance of the laws do make one attempt or
another to define the types of accounts, services, or sources employers or
educational institutions are precluded from coercing or requesting access
into. Illinois, Delaware, and New Jersey each provide strikingly similar
definitions of "social networking" websites or sites. Illinois defines a
81 Mo. ConE ANN., Labor and Employment S 3-712 (West 2013).
82 Id.
8 William Carleton, Grading the social media savvy ofsix state legislatures, COUNSELOR @ LAw BLOG (an.
13, 2013), http://www.wac6.com/wac6/2013/01/grading-the-social-media-savvy-of-six-state-legislatures.html
[hereinafter Social Media Grades] (Compiling opinions and quotations from five attorneys with internet-law
based practices in assessing the six state OSN legislative efforts).
8 MD. CODE ANN., Labor and Employment 5 3-712 (West 2013).
8s "Electronic communication device means a cell phone, personal digital assistant, electronic device
with mobile data access, laptop computer, pager, broadband personal communication device, 2-way messaging
device, electronic game, or portable computing device" DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, 5 8101-8105 (West 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted); "Electronic communications device means any device that uses electronic
signals to create, transmit, and receive information, including a computer, telephone, personal digital assistant, or
other similar device" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
586 Id.
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"social networking website" as "an Internet-based service that allows
individuals to: (A.) construct a public or semi-public profile within a
bounded system, created by the service; (B) create a list of other users
with whom they share a connection within the system; and (C) view and
navigate their list of connections and those made by others within the
system."" Delaware's definition differs slightly, but contains largely the
same elements: "an internet-based, personalized, privacy-protected
website or application whether free or commercial that allows users to
construct a private or semi-private profile site within a bounded system,
create a list of other system users who are granted reciprocal access to the
individual's profile site, send and receive email, and share personal
content, communications, and contacts."8
This granular approach with specific criteria appears directly targeted
at Facebook and services currently in existence that follow a similar
model." In stark contrast, California and Michigan attempted to employ a
broader formulation to capture existing services as well as future ones.90
California defines "social media" as "an electronic service or account, or
electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs,
blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online
services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations" in each of
its OSN-related laws, covering employers and higher education
institutions.9 ' The practical result is that any user-generated content a
candidate or current employee/student posted to the internet that requires
some level of username knowledge is protected.
This demarcation is significant, and the immensely popular Twitter
service92 provides an instructive example. Not all OSNs concern systems
wherein a list of users are granted reciprocal access to ones profile. Twitter
8 820 Ii.. COMP. STAT. 55 / 10 (2013). The New Jersey law has an identical definition. N.J. SiTAT.
ANN. § 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013).
88 DEL. COD. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101-8105 (West 2013).
89 "The definition may or may not capture the essence of the next generation of social media services,
but it gets granular enough so as to make meaningful distinctions. It describes (and thus captures) the way
Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ work today, but the definition is narrow enough that it probably doesn't snare
too many other kinds of web services." William Carleton, Quite Possibly the World's First Statutory Definition of
"Social Networking Website", COUNSELOR @ LAW BLOG (Jun. 21, 2012), http://www.wac6.com/wac6/2012/05/
quite-possibly-the-worlds-first-statutory-definition-of-a-social-network.html
9 Jesse Koehler, California Privacy Legislation: Wins and Losses, BFRKIELEY TECH. L.J. BoT (October 17,
2012), http://btlj.org/?p=1904 ("[T]his broad definition the legislature attempted to reach all existing and future
social media services") [hereinafter Koehler].
91 CAL. LAB. CODF § 980 (West 2013); CAL. Euuc. CO1E § 99120-99122 (West 2013).
92 Twitter is the fastest growing "social platform" in the world. Studies estimate the service has
approximately 288 million active monthly users accounting for 21% of the global internet population. See TJ
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involves sending out micro-blog entries with text or images in the form of
"tweets" and does not readily conform to the structured peer-to-peer
networking definitions offered by New Jersey, Delaware, and Illinois".
California eschews the specific criteria for a sweeping formulation in the
hopes of capturing any and all OSN services at the expense of potentially
ensnaring unintended entities as a consequence.9 4
Michigan takes this approach further and avoids defining OSNs by
their "social" nature at all. 9 5 Instead, Michigan restricts employer and
educational institution access to any "Personal Internet Account.""
Michigan defines "personal internet account" as "an account created via a
bounded system established by an internet-based service that requires a
user to input or store access information via an electronic device to view,
create, utilize, or edit the user's account info, profile, display,
communications, or stored data."97 Thus, there is nothing inherently
"social" about the OSN protection. Rather, anytime a user must "input
or store access information" the account gains privacy protection under
the law.
Significantly, Michigan alone defines "access inforniation" in its
statute: "user name, password, login information, or other security
information that protects access to a personal internet account." This
emphasis on user control falls directly in line with network privacy and an
access-based approach. As long as the user has employed any measure,
likely to be some variant of login credentials, to prevent unwanted third
party access the OSN content is legally protected. Therefore, the
Michigan law "also includes bank websites, online ticketing sites, message
boards, Dropbox, and virtually every other site somebody could
theoretically log into and store private information."99 Consequently, the
user exclusively determines the legal enforceability of privacy protection
for OSN content in Michigan, so long as the particular service in question
has access-control features.
McCue, Twitter Ranked Fastest Growing Social Platform In The World, FoB.nBs (Jan. 29, 2013, 4:01 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/01/29/twitter-ranked-fastest-growing-social-platform-in-the-world/.
S TWITITER ABOUT, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
94 See generally Koehler, supra, note 90.




9 Social Media Grades, supra, note 83.
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C. Establishing "Zones of Privacy"
Formal definitions provide the baseline of protection, but state
legislatures also must grapple with the vexing question of how and when to
protect privacy interests of OSN users. They must, in effect, cabin off
certain "zones" of privacy by taking what they have defined and applying
restrictions on employer and educational institution behavior in relation to
them. As noted in Part LI-A, supra, the states have unanimously used access
to certain content as the threshold rationale, but what particular "zones"
of privacy the legislation creates vaies considerably.
Each law prohibits some variation on employers and educational
institutions ability to "request or require" any "user name, password, or
other means for accessing" current and prospective employee or student
OSN content."' This is where the unanimity ends. Maryland and New
Jersey each place the qualifier ". . .through an electronic communications
device" as blanket requirement for any attempted access to fall within the
prohibition.'O1 Delaware also includes this provision in its "prohibited
acts" section,'0 2 but it applies solely to particular prohibitions and not the
entire legislative scheme. The limitation imposed is significant because it
forces the courts to interpret "through" in any context beyond directly
requesting password and user name information. Thus, the question of
whether employers in Maryland and educational institutions in New
Jersey may peer over the shoulder of employees or applicants while using
OSNs remains open. Furthermore, because the access must be acquired
via an electronic device, as defined in the statute, this may hamper the
applicability as technological advances undoubtedly continue into the
future.
Acknowledging these risks, states included further prohibitions on
conduct. One common theme concerns accessing private individual OSN
content through means of observation. Michigan makes it illegal for
employers to "Request an employee or an applicant for employment to
grant access to, allow observation of or disclose information that allows
access to or observation of the employee's or applicant's personal internet
00 This language comes directly from Maryland's law, but all five others possess functionally identical
wording. MD. CODE ANN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2013).
Soi Id.; N.J. SrArr. ANN. § 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013).
102 "(a) A public or nonpublic academic institution shall not request or require that a student or applicant
disclose any password or related account information in order to gain access to the student's or applicant's social
media networking site profile or account by way of an electronic communication device." DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
14, § 8101-8105 (West 2013).
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account."'o California echoes this approach, specifically disallowing
employers and schools from requesting to "Access personal social media in
the presence of the employer" or to "Divulge any personal social
media."10 4 In Delaware academic institutions "shall not require or request
that a student or applicant log onto a social networking site, email
account, or any other internet site or application by way of an electronic
communication device in the presence of an agent of the institution so as to
provide the institution access."' These explicit provisions can arguably be
found in the more general phrasing in the aforementioned Maryland and
New Jersey formulations, but their explicit nature is more in line with
network privacy. They reiterate that it is the private OSN content that the
law seeks to protect, and not the property interest of the password or user
name information itself
Delaware protects this rationale further than any other state. Its
legislation goes on to prohibit educational institutions from monitoring
student devices including through use of "intercept technology". 0 6 More
significantly though are a pair of provisions that specifically address the
problem of access acquisition through use of the OSN itself. First, "No
public or nonpublic academic institution shall request or require a student
or applicant to add the employer or its representative to their personal
social networking site profile or account." 0 7 Basically, in Facebook
parlance this equates to a prohibition on requesting or requiring the
student or applicant to "friend" the institution at any level. Research
proves this a major concern amongst young applicantsos and Delaware
reinforces this protection with the next provision: "A public or nonpublic
institution is prohibited from accessing a student's or applicant's social
networking site profile or account indirectly through any other person
who is a social networking contact of the student or applicant.""
Taken together, these edicts place a firm barrier between the
institution and the OSN profile. In the school setting, as well as the
workplace, the existence of social relationships between classmates and co-
103 Micm. COMP. LAWS S 37.271 to S 37.278 (2012) (emphasis added).
104 CAL. LAn. CODE S 980 (West 2013).
105 DEL. CoDE. ANN. 6t. 14, § 8101-8105 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
10 "(c) No public or nonpublic academic institution shall monitor or track a student's or applicant's
personal electronic communication device by installation ofsoftware upon the device, or by remotely tracking the
device by using intercept technology." Id.
07 Id.
1os "Eighty-one percent of respondents considered it inappropriate for employers to be required to invite
their supervisor to their OSN profile." Blurred Boundaries, supra note 5 at 107.
lO9 DEL. CoDE. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101-8105 (West 2013).
2013] LEGISLATING OUR REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
workers is inevitable and should be encouraged. Thus, the likelihood that
these cohorts would also be "social media contacts" is extremely high and
the social and professional pressures of accepting a "friend" request from
ones boss or superior at school are self-evident. Delaware effectively
removes an easy, and already used method for employers and schools to
circumvent password and other more basic OSN privacy protections.
In a similar vein New Jersey prevents educational institutions to "In
any way inquire as to whether a student or applicant has an account or
profile on a social networking website."10 The statute continues by
stating, "An agreement to waive any right or protection under this act is
against the public policy of this State and is void and unenforceable.""'
This presents a newfound, unique take on OSN access: the mere fact that
users engage in OSN activity is presumptively out of bounds for
educational institutions. New Jersey, unlike the other states, has made
explicit that whatever information may potentially be gleaned from an
individual's OSN use pales in value when compared with the privacy
concerns at stake.
The six laws also make critical categorical distinctions. Maryland and
Michigan each distinguish between "personal" and "nonpersonal"
accounts. For the former the entire legislative scheme is predicated on this
distinction as highlighted above, but without legislative guidance as to the
specific characteristics underlying the distinction.112 Michigan, however,
does elucidate this difference somewhat: "This act does not prohibit an
employer from. . .Requesting or requiring an employee to disclose access
information to the employer to gain access to or operate.. .An account or
service provided by the employer, obtained by virtue of the employee's
employment relationship with the employer, or used for the employer's
business purpose.""' This explanation is absolutely critical for this
distinction to have real value without court interpretation, and stays
within the network privacy paradigm. It is entirely reasonable for accounts
related to the business purpose of the employer to be outside an
employee's reasonable expectation of privacy. The difficulty lies in the fact
that ones personal and professional (or academic) lives are no longer easy
to separate in the binary sense and often OSNs are indeed used for both
110 N.J. SrAwr. ANN. § 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013).
ni Id.
112 Supra, Part 1-B. However, Maryland does provide that when accounts are used "for business
purposes" investigations into certain topics to ensure compliance are permitted. MD. COrDE ANN., Labor and
Employment § 3-712 (West 2013).
113 Micin. COMP. LAWS § 37.271 to § 37.278 (2012).
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purposes.114 Thus, Michigan attempts to provide some guidelines for
employees, employers, and the courts and while it may not be perfect this
is absolutely the direction the law must move in.
Along these lines, the majority of statues distinguish between
employer and employee devices. Only Delaware and New Jersey fail to
make some type of legislative categorization based on the ownership of
particular devices."' Again, this comports to notions of network privacy
and access. Employees should not possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the property of their employer, and even personal OSN use
could reasonably be argued to fall outside of a protected privacy interests
because the device was given for work. In many contexts this distinction
will alleviate the tension between "personal" and "nonpersonal" accounts
because it brings all OSN use within the fold for devices properly
belonging to the employer under the respective statutes. This is where
workplace policies are critical, and these states have codified the privacy
interests at stake. Not all network privacy or access-based decisions
necessarily provide increased protection for OSN use and this should not
be the goal.
Finally, the vast majority of the laws enact specific, explicit exceptions
or carve outs for employer or educational institution behavior that is
allowable despite the general statutory provisions."' Indeed, Maryland
goes as far as to proscribe certain employee conduct: "An employee may
not download unauthorized employer proprietary information or
financial data to an employee's personal web site, an internet web site, a
web-based account, or a similar account.""' While no other states cast
formal prohibitions on employee or student conduct per se, they each
allow employers or academic institutions to access otherwise protected
OSN content to investigate a range of items.
Illinois makes an explicit allowance for "obtaining.. .information that
is in the public domain."" The term "public domain" is not defined in
the statute and thereby presents major problems in application to the
digital world. Where and when something is in the "public domain",
traditionally a copyright question, is magnified by the fact that OSNs by
114 "Nearly one-third (29%) of respondents included their immediate supervisor as an online
"friend". ..some welcomed their employer's particpaion in their social networks; others reported being required
to give their employers access to their profiles." Blurred Boundaries, supra, note 5 at 102.
1s DEL. CoDE. ANN. tit. 14, § 8101-8105 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013).
116 Only NewJersey does not contain any such provisions. N.J. STAr. ANN. 5 3-29 to 3-32 (West 2013).
1to Mo. CoDE ANN., Labor and Employment S 3-712 (West 2013).
11 820 lL. COMP. S rAr. 55 / 10 (2013).
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their nature allow and prelude access based on a litany of factors.
Consequently, what is the result when a third party re-posts applicant
information onto an account that an employer can view? Is this "public
domain" material? Does the applicant's original post receive copyright
protection and thereby preclude applicability of the statutory provision
entirely? Does crafty Google searching that produces OSN-related
material equate to a user having put this information in the "public
domain"? Questions like these are easily avoided"' and yet left drastically
open in the statute and it is one of the worst failings of any of the six
passed pieces of legislation.
The other states generally take a different strategy by specifying
particular investigatory contexts based on content as opposed to
availability that alleviate OSN privacy protections. Maryland and
Michigan each allow, provided specific information exists, investigations
into sensitive financial, proprietary, and regulatory information and
requirements. Maryland's law touches these topics in connection with
"the use of a personal web site, Internet Web site, Web-based account, or
similar account by an employee for business purposes" and "the
unauthorized downloading of an employer's proprietary information or
financial data" 2 () while Michigan provides nearly identical protections
with slightly different language.' 2 1 Neither statute defines the type of
"information" required to bring OSN content within what employers
may do, and this is an issue employers will face in drafting their workplace
policies and procedures.
Michiganl2 and Californial2 extend further to include "applicable
laws" meaning any investigation into alleged illegal employee conduct
permits cooperation into OSN content provided a sufficient level of
information has been provided and the OSN content is used reasonably
related to the investigatory proceeding. These broader formulations are
echoed in accompanying provisions allowing investigations into
"misconduct"12 and Delaware allows "investigations of suspected
criminal activity performed by a public or nonpublic institution's public
safety department or policy agency" and investigations "pursuant to an
academic institution's threat assessment policy or protocol" effectively
119 See infra Part IV.
120 MD. CODE ANN., Labor and Employment § 3-712 (West 2013).
121 MIcHI. COMp. LAWS S 37.271 to § 37.278 (2012).
122 Id.
12 CAL. LAB. CoDE § 980 (West 2013).
124 Id.; MicH. Comp. LAWS § 37.271 to § 37.278 (2012).
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providing the same protections provided the criminal conduct
investigations are performed by a third party. 1 2 5
This represents perhaps the best evidence of lawmakers taking into
account the competing employer and employee interests involved in this
sphere of legislation. Employers must be able to protect their property and
reasonably enforce legal workplace policy regulations while employees
must have their reasonable expectations of privacy respected in the OSN
context. The balance of these interests is one area where the courts and
administrative agencies must inevitably play a role, and the text of
legislation alone simply cannot be determinative of all outcomes where
technology will continually evolve along with societal norms.
In sum, these "zones of privacy" epitomize the network privacy
rationale. They place certain conduct in certain specified contexts in or
out of the purview of employers and educational institutions. More than
anything else legislation is necessary for OSNs for this precise reason:
illustrating, at least roughly, where lines exist and where clear violations
occur. At the margins it is undoubtedly difficult to administer certain
aspects of these laws, but there are still courts and reasonable workplace
policies to intervene, and it is not the goal of any legislation to
immediately take effect and cure all potential ills. The wide degree of
variability in defining terms, making distinctions, and creating the
"zones" of protected privacy for OSN must be acknowledged and gives
pause for reflection at just how difficult this area is to regulate effectively
through legislation.
PART III: EXISTING PROTECTIONS INADEQUATE DESPITE
ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Law Fails to Protect OSN Privacy in Private Employment
Context
The current patchwork of Constitutional rights, torts, and statutes
governing privacy in the United States is woefully inadequate to address
the concerns OSN use in the workplace necessitates.' 26 The slow pace
and general difficulty tort law has adapting to changing technologyl27 and
the unpredictability involved when courts inquire as to the "reasonability"
125 DEL. CoDEi. ANN. tit. 14, S 8101-8105 (West 2013).
126 Seegenerally Password or Paycheck, supra, note 69.
127 "New technologies have enabled novel social situations that generate privacy harms and concerns that
were unforeseeable by the Restatement's authors." Privacy Torts, supra, note 10 at 5.
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of privacy expectations in the OSN context 28  each contributed to
privacy law's failure to maintain the pace of technological innovation. The
latter is often characterized to reflect a generational divide between the
millennial generation and the older individuals that tend to comprise the
judiciary.' 2 9  Outdated, tangential legislation likewise has not translated
well to OSNs. 130
When Congress introduced the Social Networking Online Protection
Act (SNOPA)t ", two US Senators explicitly requested the Department of
Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
investigate existing protections for OSN privacy.13 2 This uncertainly alone
reflects the difficulty in applying statutes written before the dissemination
of the internet and email into ordinary, essential aspects of everyday
life-let alone OSN use.
More significant than mere uncertainty, however, is the fact that the
relevant legislation as interpreted does not reach the private employer
conduct at issue here. The Stored Communications Act (SCA),a' enacted
128 See Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10-C-7811, 2011 WL 6101949 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (holding "matters discussed in Maremont's Facebook and Twitter posts were not private and that
Maremont did not try to keep any such facts private" because of the size of social networks despite using privacy
protections available); but see Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Service Corp., 872 F.Supp.2d 369, 374 (2012)
(holding despite there being "no indication of how many people could permissibly view" a Facebook post, the
plaintiff stated a plausible claim for "a reasonable expectation of privacy in her Facebook posting because her
comment was disclosed to a limited number of people who she had individually invited to view a restricted access
webpage."). This note left it up to previous works to fully explain the inconsistencies and fundamental
misunderstanding of how OSNs operate the courts have shown, but suffice to say the current state of the law is at
best murky and at worst preclusive of privacy on OSNs.
129 "Those who have grown up with the Internet, particularly the recent interactive rise of web 2.0, view
online privacy in a very different way than those of previous generations who have-or have not-immigrated to
it. Younger "natives" expect technological barriers-whether real or merely imagined-to protect their
information from unintended audiences, while others view their actions as reckless and foolish." Newell, supra,
note 48 at 19.
130 Henderson, supra, note 34 at 244 ("The technologies and norms of social media have evolved rapidly,
whereas the statutory structure-and much of the particular language-has remained constant.).
131 SNOPA, supra note 17.
132 Press Release, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal, Schumer: Employer Demands for Facebook
and Email Passwords As Precondition For Job Interviews May Be A Violation Of Federal law; Senators Ask Feds
to Investigate (March 25, 2012) ("1 am alarmed and outraged by rapidly and widely spreading employer practices
seeking access to Facebook passwords or confidential information on other social networks. . .A ban on these
practices is necessary to stop unreasonable and unacceptable invasions of privacy. An investigation by the
Department of Justice and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will help remedy ongoing intrusions
and coercive practices, while we draft new statutory protections to clarify and strengthen the law.").
133 Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access, 18 U.S.C. SS 2701-
2712 (2012).
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in 1986, has yet to have its basic structure amended'14 . The SCA forbids
the intentional and unauthorized access of stored communications.1 3 5
However, if a job applicant or employee grants the employer access to
their account this forfeits claims under the SCA.'311 Thus, the onus to
prove coercion remains and when an employer merely requests this
information without explicitly stating that non-compliance will result in
punishment the inherent implication that the job may become unavailable
or retribution may occur does not necessarily go away, and therefore this
pressure incentivizes disclosure.
Similar problems of proving the access to be "unauthorized" exist
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and are made even
more daunting by the requirement that plaintiffs prove a damage or loss of
more than $5,000 over a one-year period."' As employment decisions
are, or at bottom can be argued, made upon a holistic evaluation of the
applicant it will undoubtedly be difficult to show that the OSN access
directly led to this type of harm. Furthermore, as the majority of
employees in the United States are "at will" the damages resulting for
current employees poses an equally difficult burden of proof to recover
under CFAA. Where this type of access is not explicitly unauthorized by
statute it becomes commonplace, and once commonplace societal norms
indicate that considering these requests "unauthorized" will be difficult to
prove and therefore inadequate to protect OSN privacy interests.
B. Despite Overall Inadequacy Recent Developments Are Encouraging
Recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
enforcing rights under the NLRA"' illustrate the legitimization of OSN
use by users on their personal accounts and the law adhering to modern
notions of network privacy online.'3 9 The board backed workers to hold
their Facebook posts were the type of "concerted and protected" activity
for "mutual aid" covered by the NLRA after an employee posted a
Facebook message complaining about work conditions, four coworkers
134 Henderson, supra note 34, at 244.
135 Password or Paycheck, supra note 69, at 19 (emphasis added).
136 Id.
137 18 U.S.C. 5 1030(g), 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2012).
138 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 151-169 (2012).
139 See Steven Greenhouse, Even ifIt Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protected, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 22,
2013, at Al ("The National Labor Relations Board says workers have a right to discuss work conditions freely and
without fear of retribution, whether the discussion takes place at the office or on Facebook").
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responded to it, and all five were fired.' This is a positive, and significant
development because it legitimizes Facebook (and therefore OSNs) as an
integral, protected means for employees to communicate and
acknowledges the OSN potential as the new "water cooler" at the office.
However, protecting "concerted activity"-which is when two or
more employees take action for their mutual aid or protection regarding
terms and conditions of employment for "mutual benefit" in the labor
relations context"' is not the same as protecting individual privacy. Other
NLRB cases have had less sympathy for OSN use, and where singular
employees voice displeasure on OSNs this information is entitled to less
privacy protection and may be used in termination decisions.142 This
illustrates the critical difference between employers inability to retaliate as
opposed to the right to access particular information initially. This
distinction is especially relevant for applicants as the only "retaliation" for
employer OSN access from their perspective is a failure to be hired at all.
Indeed, the NLRB explicitly covers and affords employees certain rights,
and while they have done a commendable job updating provisions from a
1935 law enacted to protect the bargaining power of labor unions to the
21st-century OSN context, these tangential protections to individual
privacy are simply insufficient to protect all the potential harms this
activity poses.
Finally, the Supreme Court recently has shown encouraging signs that
its hardline stance against reevaluating privacy jurisprudence may be
thawing.14 3 In a strongly worded concurrence, Justice Sotomayor posited,
"More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. . . This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks."1 44 Sotomayor, more than any Justice before, gives credence to the
fact that sweeping, rapid technological change warrants consideration of
past doctrine in a new light. Also significant, she asserts a view fully in line
with network privacy: "I would not assume that all information
140 United Hispanics of Buffalo, Inc. and Carlos Ortiz, 359 N.L.R.B. 37 (2012).
141 NLRA, supra, note 20.
142 See Greenhouse, supra note 139.
143 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). While admittedly
the Fourth Amendment does not protect citizens against private actors, the views of the Supreme Court surely
help to inform the expectations society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
144 Id.
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voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose,
is for that reason alone" necessarily devoid of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.'
4
PART IV: THE NEED FOR UNIFORM, COMPREHENSWE,
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION TO PROTECT PRIVACY INTERESTS
OF OSN USERS IN THE PRIVATE WORKPLACE
A. Congressional Legislation Protects Employer Interests
Thus far the focus has been on employee, applicant, and student
privacy interests over their OSN use. However, comprehensive legislation
in this area is also the best way to protect employee interests, notably those
related to discrimination." 6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("CRA") of
196414 bars employers with fifteen or more employees from making
employment decisions based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' 4 8 Many states have gone further to protect against discrimination
based on age, marital status, sexual orientation, disability, political
orientation, union membership, and consumption of legal products."'
Seeking access to OSN content, even without the intent of discovering
this applicant information inevitably will produce this result, and therefore
open the employer up to discrimination liability. The sponsor of the
Illinois legislation, State Representative La Shawn Ford, echoed this
rationale: "Social networking accounts are places where we document the
personal and private aspects of our lives, and employers have realized they
can get answers to questions they are already prohibited from asking by
gaining unfettered access to our accounts. . .This legislation may protect
employers from future lawsuits as much as it protects employees and
jobseekers."'5s
With the millennial generation possessing such a demonstrated
commitment to its OSN privacy expectations' 5 1 this avenue of litigation,
if privacy rights remain unenforced, is arguably inevitable and certainly
conceivable. And while redress in the CRA is a positive thing, it is in no
one's best interest for these discrimination suits to persist, especially since
decisions may or may not in actuality be tied to discrimination. There is
145 See id.
146 Password or Paycheck, supra, note 69, at 21.
147 42 U.S.C. §5 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
14 42 U.S.C. §5 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a) (2012).
149 Password or Paycheck, supra, note 69, at 21.
50 IL Press Release, supra, note 65.
1s See supra Part 1.
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no doubt that there is potentially valuable information in an applicant's
OSN profile, 15 2 but the benefits are outweighed substantially by the
pitfalls. Using OSNs as a means around existing regulation is disingenuous
and illegal, so to protect to employers from themselves legislation
safeguards their interests. Again, the aforementioned "tangential" privacy
backdrop of United States law becomes readily apparent, and one can
surely make the argument that, with Title VII in mind, individuals possess
a right to privacy in this information (at least for the non-self evident
criteria of religion and national origin) during the application process.
However, until legal prohibitions specifically tied to OSN information
access are enacted employers will continue to operate under the
assumption that their conduct is entirely legal, or at worst "murky", and
the onus remains on applicants and employees to show discrimination
where often the litigation is not worth the reward.
B. Suggested Criteria for Effective Comprehensive Congressional
Legislation
The proliferation and stunning rise in popularity of OSNs to the
point where they are fundamental to modern communication presents a
historic opportunity to move workplace privacy protection up to where it
must be. Congress must capitalize on this wave of popularity and support
while remaining cognizant to not unnecessarily cabin its prohibitions on
the technology of the day or enact legislation too expansive as to swallow
everything potentially posted online. This delicate balance can only be
achieved through the network privacy approach predicated on access to
particular information by particular constituencies in particular contexts.
Congress recently reintroduced SNOPA'" and this provides a useful
starting point. The proposal stays true to the access theory of reasonable
expectations, but it would behoove Congress to take account of the
enacted legislation in the six states and fuse together some of their critical
contributions.
First, SNOPA provides protection for "private email account" and
"the personal account. . .on any social networking website.""' Explicitly
bringing email within the statute avoids confusion and closer adheres to
152 See Password or Paycheck, supra note 69, at 18 ("Recent studies have shown that an individual's OSN
profile can provide an accurate window into the individual's personality and character").
153 Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013).
154 Id.
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network privacy, unlike Illinois who took the opposite approach. 5
Following Michigan and California it takes the comprehensive approach
to protect applicants, employees, and current students. The act defines
"social networking website" as "any internet service, platform, or website
that provides a user with a distinct account - (A) whereby the user can
access such account by way of a distinct user name, password, or other
means distinct for that user; and (B) that is primarily intended for the user
to upload, store, and manage user-generated personal content on the
service, platform, or website."' 5s This definition is very similar in effect to
Michigan's in that it covers more than "social" websites-the coverage is
based on user-generated content protected in some fashion. This is the
best approach elucidated in any of the laws, but Congress would benefit
from specifying that "personal content" includes information shared with
others. Again, network privacy is premised on the harm defined when
information moves across specified constituencies and therefore even
when certain items are shared with others they remain access-protected
from those outside the intended network. Additionally, this approach is
not over-inclusive because whatever informiation employers are within
their rights to possess, such as financial information, may be requested of
the applicant, student, or employee to provide without needing to
surrender access information. The onus is on the employee or applicant to
affirmative place access barriers on their accounts, and once they have the
law creates a presumption of privacy protection and this is essential.
While Congress generally took the right tack with its "social
networking website" definition it failed to demarcate the line between
"personal" and "nonpersonal" and this must be corrected. Modem OSN
use has shown us that this line is difficult to find. Often information
relevant to the workplace or school becomes intermingled with purely
personal content such as image uploads or messages to third parties.
However, what is an employer to make of an employee wearing his work
uniform while engaging in illicit activity in his Facebook profile picture?
Or an employee Tweeting defamatory statements to an audience of
thousands? The best, although admittedly not perfect solution to this
problem is to provide an explanation that "personal" accounts do not
include those "provided by the employer, obtained by virtue of the
employee's employment relationship, or used for business purposes"'5 7 , or
155 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55 / 10 (2013).
156 Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013).
15 Seegeterally Micii. COMP. LAWS %§ 37.272(d), 37.273, 37.275(a)(ii) (2012) (utilizing the language in
Michigan's statutes to support that such accounts are not personal because employers are not prohibited from
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those accounts "whose content may be viewed without the input of user-
created access protections." This final caveat is critical to protect employer
interests, and is a much better approach than Illinois' "public domain"
provision by alleviating vagueness concerns.'15  Although it leaves room
for interpretation at the margins it provides guidance as to what is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a statement made on an OSN.
Furthermore, SNOPA eliminates employers right to "require or
request than at an employee or applicant provide the employer with a user
name, password, or any other means for accessing" these personal email
and social networking accounts. Thus, the only prohibited access stems
from direct requests made upon the employee or applicant themselves and this is
an unacceptably limiting provision in the legislation. It does not prohibit
explicitly any other means of access or define "means for accessing", and
although the language "any other means" could potentially gain a broad
construction and cover observing the employee at work it is not ideal to
leave this decision up to litigation and interpretation. Rather, Congress
should borrow the innovations in the Delaware legislation"' to proscribe
specific conduct including third party contacting and in-person
observation. Employers should be explicitly barred from requesting or
requiring an applicant or employee to take any particular action with a
personal internet account. This would go a long way towards enforcing
against these more "unorthodox" methods of procuring access to OSNs
and prevent certain coercive or investigatory work from being farmed out
to third parties. Because the main goal of this legislation to set the law in
line with prevailing social norms, the explicit explication of "means of
access" is essential to fully promote it.
Congress, like Michigan and New Jersey, provides specific penalties
and an enforcement scheme in SNOPA. Violating employers may be
assessed civil penalties up to $10,000 as determined by taking "into
account the previous record. . .and the gravity of the violation."'o Also,
the Secretary of Labor may take injunctive action to ensure compliance
and is given the broad power to provide "such legal or equitable relief
incident thereto as may be appropriate, including; employment,
reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of lost wages and benefits."''
requesting or requiring access to such accounts even though employers cannot require access to "personal"
accounts).
158 See supra Part Ill.
15 See supra Part Ill.
160 Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013).
161 Id.
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This enforcement scheme goes well beyond Michigan and differs from
New Jersey in power and penalty for violations. 162 The ability to provide
injunctive relief, the relatively large dollar amount of the maximum
penalty, and the increased punishment for repeat offenders are excellent
features, and are necessary to enforce privacy rights where often the
showing of actual damages will be difficult. Additionally, empowering the
Secretary to take injunctive action may place large entities on notice,
thereby requiring their privacy policies to meet a federal minimum
helping to inform reasonable expectations for all of society.
Finally, Congress does not place exemptions in SNOPA. There are no
distinctions for employee versus employer owned devices or an allowance
to monitor equipment at the office or the right to conduct investigations
upon receipt of specific information. This is a mistake from both a
legislative and political maneuvering standpoint. Opposition to the
legislation generally stems from its failure to properly protect business
interests, and not allowing reasonable measures to be taken upon a valid
showing of legitimate need does indeed fail to fully protect business
interests. Passwords and user account information should never be on the
table in any circumstance and mere "workplace misconduct" should
remain insufficient for access into private OSNs for investigation.
However, certain statutory provisions that require employees or current
students to provide specific OSN content in relation to specific investigations
of a pressing nature-sensitive financial inforiation, securities regulation,
regulatory requirements, and violations of positive law-are not only
reasonable, but important to legitimize the legislation as truly representing
the interests of both private individuals and institutions. Companies
cannot remain liable for certain failures to monitor while being
simultaneously prevented from doing so. The sensitivity of data and the
ability for OSN use to intermingle with company owned devices makes
this a common-sense addition to any Congressional legislation.
Overall, SNOPA is a bold step forward and its influence on the
successfully enacted state legislation is evident. Congress effectively
defined the types of entities it wished to keep private and free from access
in its emphasis on user-generated content. Its definition reinforces privacy
expectations in OSNs in how they are actually used. That the
enforcement scheme also promotes the goals of the legislation, the unique
162 CoFtlpareMicti. Comp. LAWS % 37.271-37.278 (2012) (providing that violating parties are guilty of a
misdemeanor and capping monetary sanctions at $1,000 in Michigan), with [insert correct citation of the new
jersey statute here] (permitting injunctive relief, undefined compensatory damages, undefined consequential
damages, and "any other available remedy" in its enforcement scheme in New Jersey).
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federal enforcement capacity, and has comprehensive breadth to cover
educational institutions and all employers is admirable. However, the
legislation falls short in its prohibition solely of those means of access
wherein requests are made directly upon the employee or applicant. This
leaves open loopholes with potential to swallow the protection.
Additionally, Congress fails to delineate and define what makes accounts
"personal" and this ambiguity is not one the courts should have to wrestle
without any guidance. Last, Congressional legislation needs to make more
allowances for circumstances where some level of OSN information access
is warranted. As constituted SNOPA does not allow for reasonable
requests for employee content or information even to assure compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. These are essential provisions that
must be added to fully ensure the rights and obligations of employers and
educational institutions are protected.
CONCLUSION
Congress alone possesses the power to enact legislation that creates
mandatory legal minimums for all citizens to follow. While the trend of
state law proposals and enactments in a majority of states is undoubtedly
encouraging, this patchwork approach is an insufficient substitute for a
federally enforced baseline of protection as there is no guarantee every
state will pass such a law nor is there any guarantee particular states will
reach far enough to effectively protect OSN privacy interests. Thus,
Congress is uniquely situated to address a problem that other areas of the
law have thus far failed to and that affects the lives of every citizen every
single day.
If we cannot control access to the content we post on OSNs we face
the certain reality of losing the documented social and societal utility these
incredible technologies present. We lose freedom of information and we
chill valuable protected speech. We lose autonomy and we lose dignity.
Without legislation to enforce privacy expectations that are
overwhelmingly reasonable in all eyes besides the law the internet ceases
to be as powerful of an instrument that we as a society should require it to
be. Technological progress has made it easier for private information to
fall in the hands of unintended constituencies, but our fundamental right
to privacy as citizens should not pay the price for that progress. Incredibly,
Congress has the power to alleviate the vast majority of these concerns
with a simple piece of legislation. The time is now for us to ensure that
Americans online existence comes equipped with the same privacy
protections as its offline counterpart.
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